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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a novel sealed-bid auction
framework to address the problem of dynamic spectrum allo-
cation in cognitive radio (CR) networks. We design an optimal
auction mechanism that maximizes the moderator’s expected util-
ity, when the spectrum is not available with certainty. We assume
that the moderator employs collaborative spectrum sensing in
order to make a reliable inference about spectrum availability.
Due to the presence of a collision cost whenever the moderator
makes an erroneous inference, and a sensing cost at each CR, we
investigate feasibility conditions that guarantee a non-negative
utility at the moderator. We present tight theoretical-bounds
on instantaneous network throughput and also show that our
algorithm provides maximum throughput if the CRs have i.i.d.
valuations. Since the moderator fuses CRs’ sensing decisions to
obtain a global inference regarding spectrum availability, we
propose a novel strategy-proof fusion rule that encourages the
CRs to simultaneously reveal truthful sensing decisions, along
with truthful valuations to the moderator. Numerical examples
are also presented to provide insights into the performance of
the proposed auction under different scenarios.
Index Terms—Cognitive Radio Networks, Spectrum Avail-
ability Uncertainty, Auctions, Spectrum Allocation, Spectrum
Sensing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, spectrum scarcity has driven several
researchers to pursue the problem of dynamic spectrum access
(DSA) [1] for cognitive-radios (CRs). Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) relaxed some of its license protocols,
after identifying the inefficient usage of spectrum by the PUs
(licensed users), and encouraged the use of licensed spectrum
by unlicensed secondary users or CRs, without interfering with
the PUs. In order to implement the solutions offered by DSA,
intelligent CRs were proposed by Mitola in [2] which learn and
adapt to the dynamically changing environment (spectrum).
In the problem of dynamic spectrum allocation, multiple CRs
compete for the same primary users (PU) channel, whenever
it is not being used. In such a case, there is a need for a
mechanism that allocates the spectrum among the CRs in the
network. In this paper, we focus our attention on how auction
mechanisms can resolve the problem of spectrum allocation
among multiple CRs.
FCC proposed two important variants of the problem of
dynamic spectrum allocation (for example, in the case of
Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (UNII) devices
[3]), namely deterministic and nondeterministic spectrum al-
locations. In deterministic spectrum allocation, the modera-
tor (base-station that allocates the spectrum) has complete
knowledge about spectrum availability, while allocating the
spectrum to the participating CRs. For a comprehensive study
on deterministic spectrum auctions and their applications, the
reader is specifically referred to [4]–[7].
In this paper, we focus on nondeterministic spectrum alloca-
tion mechanisms, where the moderator does not have complete
knowledge of the state of the PU’s spectrum (available/busy for
use by CRs). In such a scenario, the moderator relies mainly
on the prior distributions and spectrum sensing capabilities of
the CRs to gain knowledge about the PU’s spectrum usage (as
in the case of UNII-II devices). Based on sensing decisions
and spectrum valuations provided by the CRs, the moderator
allocates the spectrum when deemed available, and charges the
CRs for providing service as a moderator. This necessitates us
to consider the problem of designing a market-based spectrum
management mechanism where the traded commodity in the
market (spectrum) is available with uncertainty. In designing
such a market-based framework, we encounter the following
major challenges. First, CRs, being selfish and rational entities,
may reveal falsified sensing decisions as well as incorrect
valuations in order to make a higher profit. Second, there are
several costs involved that contribute negatively to the players’
utilities, such as sensing costs at the CRs, and collision costs
if the moderator makes erroneous inferences regarding spec-
trum availability. In such a scenario, how do we incentivize
participation of SUs and maintain feasibility? Third, at what
price would the trading of the uncertainly available spectrum
take place?
In answer to the aforementioned questions, we propose to
use auctions [8]. Specifically, we design an optimal auction
mechanism that maximizes the utility (revenue) of the mod-
erator while maintaining individual-rationality (to incentivize
CR participation), and, incentive-compatibility by ensuring
truthful revelations of sensing decisions as well as valuations
of the CRs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work to design an optimal spectrum auction in the presence
of spectrum uncertainty, as well as the first work that ensures
truthfulness in multiple dimensions.
A. Recent Work
In the recent past, there have been few works that address
spectrum auctions for CR networks in the presence of spec-
ar
X
iv
:1
40
3.
68
07
v3
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 13
 N
ov
 20
15
2trum uncertainty. In 2012, to the best of our knowledge, we
were the first to propose a nondeterministic auction mechanism
for spectrum allocation [9] that maximizes the moderator’s
expected utility. However, in [9], we investigated a restricted
solution space that does not guarantee individual rationality at
the participating CRs. Furthermore, we only addressed truthful
revelation of valuations alone in our model in [9].
In [10], Li et al. proposed an online nondeterministic auc-
tion mechanism that maximizes a social-welfare function over
a finite time-horizon, where the valuations are asynchronously
transmitted to the moderator. In contrast, in our current work,
we design an optimal auction that maximizes the expected
utility (revenue) of the moderator, to fill-in the void that
remains, given that the prior work in [10] has proposed
an auction that maximizes “social welfare” under spectrum
uncertainty. Furthermore, we consider a synchronous (offline)
mechanism where the CRs reveal their information at the same
time. Note that both these auction mechanisms (social-welfare
vs. revenue-maximization, online vs. offline) are two diverse
perspectives in any mechanism design, and therefore, they
complement each other. The choice between the two auction
mechanisms is scenario-specific, and we refer the reader to
[8], [11], [12] for a detailed account on tradeoffs between the
two diverse perspectives.
Also in 2013, Tehrani et al. proposed a first-price auction
mechanism [13] which does not guarantee truthful revelations
of either CRs’ sensing decisions or the valuations. Therefore,
CRs may have an incentive to reveal false valuations to the
moderator in order to improve their individual utilities.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we design a novel nondeterministic, truthful
and a sealed-bid auction mechanism called Optimal Auction
under Uncertain Spectrum Availability, in short, OAUSA, that
maximizes the moderator’s utility in the presence of erroneous
spectrum sensing decisions at the moderator. We assume a
cooperative spectrum sensing framework where the spatially
distributed CRs sense the spectrum and send processed obser-
vations to the moderator, where these processed observations
are fused into a global inference. For more details on the
benefits of cooperative spectrum sensing such as, how it
alleviates the hidden node problem, the reader may refer to
[14]–[16]. Following are the main contributions of the paper:
• We design an optimal auction that maximizes the mod-
erator’s utility (revenue) in the presence of uncertainly
available PU spectrum. Note that the prior work in
[10] has addressed an auction framework that maximizes
“social welfare”.
• Due to the presence of spectrum uncertainty and the costs
of participation and collision, the auction mechanism
need not always be feasible. So, we derive conditions
under which our proposed auction is feasible. We also
investigate the conditions under which there is a need for
spectrum sensing.
• We propose an auction that ensures truthfulness in the
revelation of sensing decisions as well as valuations.
To the best of our knowledge, we investigate spectrum
Notation Range Description
ti [ai, zi] True valuation at the ith CR.
pi(·) R+ Probability density function of ti
Fi(·) [0, 1] Cumulative density function of ti
vi [ai, zi] Revealed valuation at the ith CR
wi [ai, zi] Virtual valuation at the ith CR
ψi [0, 1] Probability(Fraction) of spectrum allocated to the ith CR.
bi R Payments made by the ith CR to the moderator
cp R+ Participation cost incurred at the CRs
ccoll R+ Collision cost imposed by the PU to the moderator
Pfi [0, 1] Probability of false alarm at the i
th CR
Pdi [0, 1] Probability of detection at the i
th CR
Qf [0, 1] Probability of false alarm at the moderator
Qd [0, 1] Probability of detection at the moderator
q0 [0, 1] Joint probability of deciding H0 and PU’s state being H0
q1 [0, 1] Joint probability of deciding H0 and PU’s state being H1
Ui R Expected utility at the ith CR in OAUSA
U0 R Expected utility at the moderator in OAUSA
Uˆi R Expected utility at the ith CR in traditional auctions
Uˆ0 R Expected utility at the moderator in traditional auctions
TABLE I: Glossary of Notation
auction mechanisms that address multi-dimensional truth-
fulness for the first time. We also provide analytical
bounds on the change in the utility due to our strategy-
proof fusion rule.
• We present theoretical bounds on the network throughput
due to our proposed auction. Furthermore, we also show
that our auction provides maximum throughput when
the CRs have statistically independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) valuations.
• Simulation results are provided to illustrate the dynamics
and effectiveness of the proposed auction mechanism
under various scenarios.
Note that the proposed auction design is not only a contri-
bution to dynamic spectrum allocation in CR networks, but,
advances auction theory in general. In fact, the proposed auc-
tion is a generalized Myerson’s optimal auction [17] applicable
to stochastic scenarios where the resource is not available with
certainty. The proposed auction reduces to Myerson’s optimal
auction if the moderator has complete knowledge about the
state of the PU spectrum with zero collision and participation
costs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a network of N CRs which compete for a given
PU’s spectrum, as shown in Figure 1. We assume the presence
of a moderator which is responsible for the task of spectrum
allocation in our proposed mechanism. In this paper, we
assume that the moderator has no knowledge about the true
state of the PU activity in the spectrum. But, we assume that
the moderator has knowledge regarding the prior distribution
of the PU channel state, and the observation model at the
CRs. This information is available at the moderator under the
premise that the moderator is aware of the existence and the
3Moderator
(FC / Auctioneer)
PU Activity
CR-1 CR-2 CR-3 CR-N
Fig. 1: Cognitive-Radio Network Model for collaborative
spectrum sensing and allocation
location of PU. Therefore, the moderator has two roles: fusion
of sensing decisions and allocation of available PU spectrum
among the CRs in the network.
In order to make reliable decisions about the spectrum
allocations with minimal interference to the PU, we assume
that the CRs transmit hard-quantized observations (binary
decisions) regarding spectrum availability to the moderator, so
that the moderator fuses all these sensor messages into a global
inference about the PU activity. This role (subsystem) of the
moderator is that of a fusion center (FC). If the moderator
makes an inference that the spectrum is available, then it
allocates the spectrum among the set of N CRs in the network
via an auction mechanism in which the moderator plays the
role of an auctioneer.
In short, the auctioneer subsystem acquires the knowledge
of spectrum availability from the FC and allocates the spec-
trum to the CRs only when it deems it profitable.
In the remainder of the section, we present the system
model in two subsections dedicated to the tasks of sensing-
data fusion and the auction of available PU spectrum at the
moderator respectively. For the sake of clarity in articulating
the role of the moderator, henceforth, we use the terms ’FC’
and ’auctioneer’ in the place of moderator according to the
context and need.
A. Sensing Model
Spectrum sensing is a binary hypothesis-testing problem
where H0 corresponds to the absence of the PU activity
while H1 corresponds to the presence of the PU activity
in the licensed band. We assume that the moderator only
knows the prior probabilities of the two hypotheses, which
are denoted as pi0 = P (H0) and pi1 = P (H1). Note that the
secondary network is interested in identifying H0 for spectrum
opportunities, and H1 to avoid collisions with the PU.
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , N} denote the set of CRs in the
network. We assume that the CRs perform collaborative spec-
trum sensing by sending their sensing decisions to the FC.
The ith CR senses the spectrum and sends a binary decision
ui ∈ {0, 1} to the FC. The FC makes a global decision about
the spectrum availability based on all the sensor decisions. In
this paper, we assume that the probabilities of false alarm and
detection (denoted Pfi and Pdi respectively) of the i
th CR are
known at the FC, for all i ∈ N.
For the sake of tractability, we assume that all the CRs
in the network reveal their sensing decisions truthfully to the
moderator. However, due to the competitive nature of the CRs
in acquiring the PU spectrum for their personal needs, they
may rationally deviate from revealing their sensing decisions
truthfully in order to improve their individual’s utilities. There-
fore, in Section V, we investigate conditions under which no
CR has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from revealing
truthful sensing decisions to the moderator. This condition
eliminates the possibility of two CRs colliding with each
other during their respective secondary transmissions in the
PU channel.
Since the FC fuses all the participating CRs’ local decisions
to obtain a reliable inference about the PU activity, the detec-
tion performance at the FC can be characterized by the global
probabilities of false alarm and detection, denoted as Qf and
Qd respectively. Both these quantities can be computed in
terms of Pfi and Pdi , for all i ∈ N, for a given fusion rule.
Furthermore, we assume that the moderator has knowledge
about the observation model at the CRs, which it uses to
design the optimal fusion rule. As an example, we present
the computation of Qf and Qd for a k-out-of-n fusion rule
in our simulation results in Section VI, where k is optimal in
the sense of error probability.
B. Auction Model
The moderator may not be willing to provide its service for
free (e.g., an IEEE 802.22 BS [18]) and may be a profit seeking
entity. Thus, we assume that the CRs have to pay the FC for
the service. In any auction, before the process of auctioning
starts, the auctioneer valuates the item to be auctioned. Since
we assume that the moderator does not have any personal use
for spectrum, in this paper, we assume that the moderator’s
valuation for the available spectrum is zero. Note that the
moderator finds it profitable to allocate the available spectrum
only when the revenue from the auction is non-negative.
Likewise, every CR valuates the available spectrum depending
on its need for spectrum. We assume that the ith CR has a
truthful valuation (type) ti for the available spectrum. In this
paper, we assume that ti is a random variable with probability
density function pi(ti) and cumulative density function Fi(ti).
We assume that each of the valuations ti ∈ [ai, zi] for all
i = 1, · · · , N , where ai and zi are the minimum and the
maximum value that the ith CR can valuate. Of course, when
the spectrum is not available for secondary usage (hypothesis
H1 is true), we assume that the spectrum is valuated at all the
nodes (N CRs, and the moderator) to be zero.
Having valuated the spectrum locally at the CR, the val-
uations are revealed to the auctioneer (through noiseless,
orthogonal control-channels) for spectrum allocation. We also
assume that these communication channels are secure, and
hence, we restrict ourselves to a sealed-bid framework in our
auction design. But, being rational entities, the CRs might
4reveal false valuations for selfish reasons, in order to acquire
greater utility. So, we denote the valuation revealed by the ith
CR to the moderator as vi ∈ [ai, zi] (which may or may not
equal to ti). Of course, the choice of vi depends on the true
valuation ti of the ith CR. Once the spectrum auctioning is
complete, the ith CR gets a spectrum allocation ψi ∈ [0, 1]
and pays a total amount of bi ∈ R to the moderator at the
end, for having participated in the auction. Note that, if the
spectrum is indivisible, ψi can be interpreted as the probability
of allocating the spectrum to the ith CR, while if the spectrum
is divisible, ψi can be interpreted as the fraction of spectrum
allocated to the ith CR.
Note that, in the case where the spectrum-of-interest is
treated as an indivisible entity, then valuations can be as-
sociated with any model, as the allocation is stochastic in
nature. On the other hand, if ψi is interpreted as a fractional
allocation, then valuations are restricted to linear models.
Although valuation models are restricted to a linear structure
in the case of divisible spectra, for example, the most relevant
and practical example for calculating valuations is based on
throughput, denoted Πi, as shown below.
ti = αiΠi = ci log (1 + SNRi) , (1)
where αi is a known constant for all i = 1, · · · , N , and,
SNRi is the instantaneous SNR at the corresponding ith
CR’s receiver. Since the receive SNR is unknown beforehand
especially in the context of fading models, ti is a random
variable due to the randomness in SNRi whose density
function can be computed for a given channel model.
Given that the moderator makes all of its decisions based
on the CRs’ sensing decisions, there is a finite probability
with which it can make errors. The error that is of particular
concern to the moderator is the case where it allocates the
spectrum when the PU is using it. In this case, CRs collide
with the PU due to erroneous sensing inference made by
the moderator. Therefore, in this paper, we assume that the
moderator is responsible for such a mishap regarding which
PU penalizes it with a collision cost ccoll. This is enabled
through an underlying protocol where both the PU and the
moderator can communicate between themselves and decide
the state of the system.
Table II describes the payoffs corresponding to different
strategies employed by different players in the auction model,
where ccoll is the cost of a collision with the PU, and cp
is the cost of participation (includes cost of sensing and
transmission) for a given CR. As shown in Table II, we
assume that the CRs are risk-neutral and restrict the structure
of the payoffs to be additively separable in terms of payments,
spectrum and costs incurred.
Note that, in our model, we impose the penalty of collisions
completely on the FC making it responsible for its erroneous
decisions, while the CRs bear a participation cost cp if
they participate in the spectrum sensing task, whether or not
spectrum allocation is made to them. In addition, the term
N∑
i=1
ψiccoll represents the total cost that the FC bears due to
CR-i Moderator
(FC / Auctioneer)
Acquire observations (ri)
from the PU’s channel
at CR-i and quantize
them into ui, decide the
valuation ti of the
spectrum at CR-i
Fuse all the decisions u
from the CRs and make
a global inference u0,
Auction the spectrum
whenever it is available
based on the CRs’
valuations tUse the allocated
spectrum ψi, Give the
appropriate payment to
the FC
Accumulate all the
payments b from the
CRs
ui, vi
ψi
bi
Fig. 2: Interactions between the CRs and the FC (Auctioneer)
the allocation ψ. Note that, if
N∑
i=1
ψi = 1, then the moderator
incurs the complete cost of collision, ccoll.
Figure 2 shows the interactions between the CRs and the
moderator in our proposed mechanism. Once the CRs make
their observations, they transmit their local decisions u, along
with their valuations (revelations) v to the moderator. With
the sensing knowledge from u, the FC subsystem makes a
global inference about the PU state and informs the auctioneer
subsystem along with the corresponding Qf and Qd respec-
tively. After the auctioning process, the moderator provides
the allocation vector ψ to the CRs, and the CRs pay b to the
moderator for its service.
It is worth mentioning that our auction-based mechanism
reduces to several problems of interest as special cases in the
context of dynamic spectrum access. Note that if ccoll = 0,
pi0 = 1, Qf = 0 and Qd = 1, then the auction mechanism
reduces to the problem of spectrum commons, where the CRs
share unlicensed spectrum that is available with certainty.
On the other hand, one can interpret ψ as a fractional
or a stochastic allocation vector depending on whether the
spectrum is divisible or indivisible respectively. In the case of
divisible spectrum, the CRs would employ an OFDM-based
system so that an appropriate waveform is designed within
the allocated bandwidth. Otherwise, a CR employs a simple
spectrum-overlay system when the spectrum is indivisible.
C. Some Definitions: Expected Utilities, Rationality, Truthful-
ness and Feasibility
Being a rational entity, the moderator would want to max-
imize its net utility. Since the moderator is also responsible
for allocating the spectrum, it also incurs the losses whenever
erroneous decisions are made regarding the availability of the
spectrum, resulting in collisions with the PU. Obviously, if the
PU’s presence is detected, then there is no motivation for the
moderator to allocate the spectrum to the CRs. On the other
hand, when PU’s absence is detected, the moderator allocates
the spectrum to the CRs, if profitable. While collisions with
the PU transmissions occur when there is a misdetection at
the FC with a probability q1 = pi1(1−Qd), allocation without
collision takes place with probability q0 = pi0(1 − Qf ).
Of course, allocation does not take place with a probability
5Player Strategies Utilities Moderator’s Inference True Hypothesis Comments
N∑
i=1
bi H0 H0 no collision
Allocate (A) N∑
i=1
bi −
N∑
i=1
ψiccoll H0 H1 collision
FC N∑
i=1
bi H1 H0 no collision
Not Allocate (NA) N∑
i=1
bi H1 H1 no collision
ψiti − bi − cp H0 H0 no collision
ith CR Declare vi
−bi − cp otherwise
TABLE II: Auction Game Model for Dynamic Spectrum Access in CR Networks
1− q0 − q1 = pi1Qd + pi0Qf .
From Table II, we define the expected utility of the moder-
ator as follows.
Definition 1. The utility of the moderator, denoted as U0, is
given by Equation (2),
U0(ψ,b) = Et
[
pi0(1−Qf )
{
N∑
i=1
bi
}
+pi1(1−Qd)
{
N∑
i=1
bi −
N∑
i=1
ψiccoll
}
+pi0Qf
{
N∑
i=1
bi
}
+ pi1Qd
{
N∑
i=1
bi
} ]
= Et
[
N∑
i=1
bi − q1ccoll
N∑
i=1
ψi
]
.
(2)
Note that the moderator is not aware of the truthful valua-
tions t, since the CRs’ revelations indicate that their valuations
are v. Therefore, we assume that the truthful valuations t form
a random vector, and therefore, the expected utility of the
moderator is computed by averaging over different values of
t.
Since the valuations are revealed confidentially to the
auctioneer, this mode-of-operation is termed direct-revelation
[17]. We address the notion of direct revelation in greater
detail, along with the notion of a given node’s rationality in
the following subsection.
Note that the moderator’s utility depends on b and ψ, which
in turn, depend on the revelations v, cp, ccoll, q0 and q1. If
the moderator receives a negative expected utility, there is no
motivation for the auction mechanism to be pursued by the
moderator.
Since a CR does not have any direct-control in the decision-
making process, the node will be satisfied as long as its
expected utility is non-negative. We define the expected utility
of the ith CR, from Table II, as follows.
Definition 2. The utility of the ith CR, denoted as Ui, is given
by
Ui(ψ,b, ti) = Et−i [q0 {ψiti − bi − cp}
+(1− q0) {−bi − cp}]
= Et−i [q0ψiti − bi − cp] ,
(3)
where t−i = {t1, · · · , ti−1, ti+1, · · · , tN}, ψi is the fraction
of bandwidth allocated to the ith CR, and bi is the price paid
by the ith CR to the FC for participating in the auction.
Also, we define the expected amount of spectrum that the
ith CR gets, in the proposed allocation, is defined as follows.
Definition 3. The expected fraction of bandwidth that node i
gets for a given valuation vi, denoted as Ψi(vi) is defined as
follows.
Ψi(vi) =
∫
q0ψi(vi, t−i)p−i(t−i)dt−i, (4)
where p−i(t−i) is the joint distribution of t−i =
{t1, · · · , ti−1, ti+1, · · · , tN}.
Since the valuation of the ith CR is known locally, it is not
treated as a random variable, and the expectation in the ith
CR’s utility is carried over t−i. In other words, we assume
that the true spectrum valuation (personal preferences) of any
given CR is not known to the other CRs.
In order to incentivize participation of CRs in the auction
mechanism, there is a need to guarantee a non-negative utility
to each of the nodes. Otherwise, the CR would not participate
because of the loss that it may incur. This condition is termed
individual rationality, and is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Individual Rationality). Individual rationality
criterion, which motivates the participation of CRs in the
auction mechanism, is defined as
Ui(ψ,b, ti) ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N, (5)
for any ti ∈ [ai, zi].
6Any selfish and rational entity tries to maximize its indi-
vidual payoff. So can a CR lie in revealing its valuations
and achieve personal gains. However, such a behavior on
the part of the CRs can lead to inefficient auction outcomes.
Therefore, in order to prevent the CRs from lying about their
valuations, we design the optimal auction mechanism with
truthful revelations from the CRs. But, in order to force all
the CRs to reveal truthful valuations to the moderator, we need
to ensure that there is no incentive for the CR to falsify its
revelations. This is called the incentive compatibility condition
and is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Incentive Compatibility). A truthful revelation is
ensured by the incentive compatibility condition, where no CR
has the incentive to reveal false valuations to the moderator.
This is given by
Ui(ψ,b, ti) ≥
∫
[q0ψi(vi, t−i)ti − bi(vi, t−i)− cp] ·
p−i(t−i)dt−i,
(6)
where, ti is the true valuation of node i, and vi 6= ti is any
dishonest valuation declared.
Note that, if the moderator finds the auction mechanism
unprofitable (U0 is smaller than 0), for all theoretical purposes,
we assume that the auction is infeasible. Of course, we
consider the possibility of having a feasible auction that allows
ψ = 0.
Thus, we define the feasibility of an auction as follows.
Definition 6 (Feasibility). We define that an auction is feasible
if the following three conditions are satisfied.
• Individual Rationality, as given by Equation (5)
• Incentive Compatibility, as given by Equation (6)
•
∑
i∈N
ψi ≤ 1, where 0 ≤ ψi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N.
• U0(ψ,b) ≥ 0.
The following lemma, often called the revelation principle,
discusses the existence of an auction design that ensures
the incentive compatibility condition. This result was first
presented by Myerson in [19].
Lemma 1 (Revelation Principle). Given any feasible auction
mechanism, there exists an equivalent feasible direct revelation
mechanism which provides the same utilities to all the players
(in this context, CRs and the moderator).
This lemma motivates us to proceed further and investigate
an optimal direct-revelation mechanism that is feasible.
III. OPTIMAL DESIGN OF AUCTION MECHANISMS UNDER
SPECTRUM AVAILABILITY UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we formulate the problem of design-
ing an optimal auction-based mechanism, and design an
auction-mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the
moderator U0, while simultaneously holding the incentive-
compatibility condition. We formally state our problem of find-
ing the optimal auction mechanism for DSA in CR networks,
in Problem 1.
Problem 1.
maximize
ψ,b
U0(ψ,b)
subject to
1. Ui(ψ,b, ti) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N. (As given in Equation (5))
2. Ui(ψ,b, ti) ≥
∫
[q0ψi(vi, t−i)ti − bi(vi, t−i)− cp] ·
p−i(t−i)dt−i,
∀ vi ∈ [ai, zi], ∀ i ∈ N. (As given in Equation (6))
3. ψi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N
ψi ≤ 1.
Note that the conditions under which we maximize the
utility of the moderator are the same as the ones presented in
Definition 6 on the feasibility of a given auction mechanism,
except for one condition where U0 ≥ 0. Therefore, we
first present an auction mechanism that satisfies individual
rationality and incentive compatibility conditions. Later, we
investigate the feasibility of the proposed auction mechanism
in Theorem 2.
We start our analysis of Problem 1 by investigating the
structure of the CRs’ utility functions. For the sake of tractabil-
ity, we restrict our analysis to a certain class of utility functions
which are monotonically increasing in terms of their true
valuations.
Lemma 2. The expected utility function of the ith player,
if monotonically increasing in its true valuation vi, can be
expressed as
Ui(ψ,b, ti) = Ui(ψ,b, ai) +
∫ ti
ai
Ψi(vi)dvi. (7)
Proof: Let us initially consider the case where ai ≤ vi ≤
ti ≤ bi. Expanding the RHS of Equation (6), we have Equation
(8).
Ui(ψ,b, ti) ≥
∫
[q0ψi(vi, t−i)ti − bi(vi, t−i)− cp] ·
p−i(t−i)dt−i
=
∫
[q0ψi(vi, t−i)(vi + ti − vi)
−bi(vi, t−i)− cp] p−i(t−i)dt−i
= Ui(ψ,b, vi) + (ti − vi)Ψi(vi).
(8)
In the case where ai ≤ ti ≤ vi ≤ bi, Equation (8) reduces
to
Ui(ψ,b, vi) ≥ Ui(ψ,b, ti) + (vi − ti)Ψi(ti). (9)
7Combining Equations (8) and (9), we have
(ti − vi)Ψi(vi) ≤ Ui(ψ,b, ti)− Ui(ψ,b, vi)
≤ (ti − vi)Ψi(ti).
(10)
If the expected utility function Ui is a monotonically increas-
ing function of the true valuation ti, then Equation (10) allows
Ui to be Riemann-integrable, resulting in Equation (7).
Next, we focus our attention on the properties of U0.
Lemma 3. The expected utility of the FC can be expressed as
U0(ψ,b) = −
N∑
i=1
Ui(ψ,b, ai) + T, (11)
where
T = E
[
N∑
i=1
q0ψi
{
ti − 1− Fi(ti)
pi(ti)
− q1
q0
ccoll
}
−Ncp
]
,
and Fi(ti) =
∫ bi
ti
pi(si)dsi.
Proof: Let us start from the definition of U0, as given in
Equation (2). Therefore, we have
U0(ψ,b) = Et
[
N∑
i=1
bi − q1ccoll
N∑
i=1
ψi
]
. (12)
Adding and subtracting
N∑
i=1
(q0ψiti − cp) in the RHS of
Equation (12), we have
U0(ψ,b) = Et
[
N∑
i=1
(cp + bi − q0ψiti)
−q1ccoll
N∑
i=1
ψi −Ncp + q0
N∑
i=1
ψiti
]
= −
N∑
i=1
∫
Ui(ψ,b, ti)pi(ti)dti
+E
[
N∑
i=1
ψi {q0ti − q1ccoll} −Ncp
]
.
(13)
Substituting the result of Lemma 2 in Equation (13), we
have
U0(ψ,b) = −
N∑
i=1
Ui(ψ,b, ai) + T, (14)
where
T = Et
[
q0
N∑
i=1
ψiti − q1ccoll
N∑
i=1
ψi −Ncp
]
−
N∑
i=1
∫ bi
ai
(∫ ti
ai
Ψ(si)dsi
)
pi(ti)dti.
(15)
Henceforth, we focus our attention to the structure of T , as
defined in Equation (15). Changing the order of integration in
the second term of the R.H.S of Equation (15), and substituting
pi1 in place of 1− pi0, we have Equation (16).
Rearranging the terms in Equation (16), we have
T = E
[
N∑
i=1
q0ψi
{
ti − 1− Fi(ti)
pi(ti)
− q1
q0
ccoll
}
−Ncp
]
.
(17)
Having used the incentive compatibility condition, given in
Equation (6) in Lemma 3, we can rewrite Problem 1 as follows.
Problem 2.
arg max
ψ,b
T −
N∑
i=1
Ui(ψ,b, ai) s.t.
1. Ui(ψ,b, ti) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N.
2. ψi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N
3.
∑
i∈N
ψi ≤ 1.
Note that the term Ncp can be interpreted as the compen-
sation that the FC pays back to the CRs to incentivize their
participation in the spectrum sensing task.
Now, we focus our attention on solving Problem 2. Using
Lemmas 2 and 3, we prove the most important result of this
section in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For all i ∈ N, if the function wi(ti) = ti −
1− Fi(ti)
pi(ti)
is strictly increasing in ti (regularity condition),
then the optimal allocation, that maximizes the moderator’s
revenue, is given by
ψ∗i =
 ∆i ; if |M(t)| > 0, ∀ i ∈M(t).
0 ; otherwise
(18)
for any ∆i such that
∑
i∈M(t)
∆i = 1, and where M(t) ={
i
∣∣∣∣ i = arg max
j∈N
wj(tj) ≥ q1
q0
ccoll
}
.
Also, the optimal payments made by the CRs to the FC are
given by
b∗i = q0ψ
∗
i ti − cp − q0
∫ ti
ai
ψ∗i (si, t−i) dsi. (19)
Proof: Note that, the term Ui(ai) has a negative con-
tribution to the utility of the moderator. As we know that
Ui(ψ,b, ti) is non-negative for all ti ∈ [ai, zi] and i ∈ N from
the individual rationality criterion, as given in Equation (5),
the moderator will let Ui(ψ,b, ai) = 0,∀i ∈ N. Substituting
this in Equation (7), we have
Ui(ti) =
∫ ti
ai
(∫
q0ψi(vi, t−i)p−i(t−i)dt−i
)
dvi. (20)
Substituting the definition of Ui(ti) (refer to Equation (3))
in Equation (20), we have
Et−i [q0ψiti − bi − cp] = Et−i
[
q0
∫ ti
ai
ψi(vi, t−i)dvi
]
.
(21)
Thus, one of the possible selection of optimal payments is
8T = E
[
q0
N∑
i=1
ψiti − q1ccoll
N∑
i=1
ψi −Ncp
]
−
N∑
i=1
∫ bi
ai
(∫ bi
si
Ψ(si)pi(ti)dti
)
dsi.
= E
[
q0
N∑
i=1
ψiti − q1ccoll
N∑
i=1
ψi −Ncp
]
−
N∑
i=1
∫ bi
ai
(1− Fi(si))Ψ(si)dsi
= E
[
q0
N∑
i=1
ψiti − q1ccoll
N∑
i=1
ψi −Ncp
]
−
N∑
i=1
∫
q0ψi
(
1− Fi(ti)
pi(ti)
)
p(t)dt.
(16)
given by
q0ψ
∗
i ti − bi − cp = q0
∫ ti
ai
ψ∗i (vi, t−i)dvi. (22)
Rearranging the terms in Equation (22), we have Equation
(19).
Driving the term Ui(ai) = 0, the utility of the moderator
can be rewritten as follows.
U0(ψ,b) = T. (23)
Therefore, we focus our attention on T , which is restated
as follows.
T = E
[
N∑
i=1
q0ψi
{
ti − 1− Fi(ti)
pi(ti)
− q1
q0
ccoll
}
−Ncp
]
.
(24)
Let us denote wi(ti) = ti− 1− Fi(ti)
pi(ti)
. Note that, if wi(ti)
is an increasing function of ti (regularity condition), then the
moderator maximizes T by allocating the spectrum to the
CRs in the set M(t) =
{
i
∣∣∣∣ i = arg max
j∈N
wj(tj) ≥ q1
q0
ccoll
}
.
Whenever |M(t)| ≥ 2, the tie-breaker can be resolved in any
manner without affecting the optimal value of T , as long as the
allocation of the spectrum is restricted to the nodes in M(t).
Since the allocation of the spectrum depends on wi(ti),
instead of the valuation ti at the ith CR, we call the term
wi(ti) as the virtual valuation of the ith CR.
Note that the ith CR’s payment, as given in Equation (19),
has an integral term
∫ ti
ai
ψ∗i (si, t−i) dsi, which needs to be
computed in order to find the payments of the ith CR. The
computation of this term is very interesting since it requires
us to investigate four cases, as follows. Within our analysis,
we denote t∗ as the valuation that corresponds to the second
highest element (in value) within the array of virtual valuations
w(t).
a) CASE-1: [i /∈M(t)] From Equation (18) in Theorem
1, we have ψ∗i (ti, t−i) = 0. Therefore,
∫ ti
ai
ψ∗i (si, t−i) dsi =
0, and consequently,
bi = −cp. (25)
b) CASE-2: [i ∈ M(t), |M(t)| ≥ 2] As shown in
Equation (18), we have ψ∗i (ti, t−i) = ∆i. But, if the i
th CR
chooses to deviate to a valuation smaller than ti, then i 3M(t)
and
∫ ti
ai
ψ∗i (si, t−i) dsi = 0. Therefore,
bi = q0∆iti − cp. (26)
c) CASE-3: [i ∈M(t), |M(t)| = 1, t∗ ≥ ai] If t∗ ≥ ai,
then the ith CR gets the spectrum as long as ti ≥ t∗. In other
words, ∫ ti
ai
ψ∗i (si, t−i) dsi =
∫ ti
t∗
1 · dsi = (ti − t∗).
Therefore, the payment at the ith CR can be calculated as
bi = q0ti − cp − q0(ti − t∗)
= q0t∗ − cp. (27)
d) CASE-4: [i ∈ M(t), |M(t)| = 1, t∗ < ai] Since
t∗ < ai, then the ith CR gets the spectrum for any ti ∈ [ai, bi].
In other words,∫ ti
ai
ψ∗i (si, t−i) dsi = (ti − ai).
Therefore, the payment at the ith CR can be calculated as
bi = q0ti − cp − q0(ti − ai)
= q0ai − cp. (28)
Combining Equations (25)-(28), the ith CR’s payment to
the moderator is summarized as follows.
bi =

−cp; if i /∈M(t)
q0∆iti − cp if i ∈M(t) and |M(t)| ≥ 2
q0t∗ − cp if i ∈M(t), |M(t)| = 1 and t∗ ≥ ai
q0ai − cp if i ∈M(t), |M(t)| = 1 and t∗ < ai.
(29)
Having computed the CRs’ payments, in the case where
|M(t)| ≥ 2, if the allocation is chosen to be ∆i = 1|M(t)| ,
then, the proposed auction mechanism can be summarized
as an algorithm, denoted Optimal Auction under Uncertain
Spectrum Availability (in short, OAUSA), in Figure 3. In case,
the designer would like to choose a different allocation ∆,
appropriate changes can be made by replacing Line 16 in
Figure 3.
IV. FEASIBILITY AND THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS
A. Feasibility of the Proposed Auction
Note that the proposed auction in Theorem 1 is feasible only
if U0 ≥ 0. Otherwise, it is more profitable for the moderator
91: procedure OAUSA(t, u)
2: Fuse u into a global inference u0
3: if u0 = 1 then
4: for all i ∈ N do
5: ψi ← 0
6: bi ← −cp
7: end for
8: else
9: wi(ti)← ti − 1− Fi(ti)
pi(ti)
, for all i = 1, · · · , N .
10: Find M(t) = {i|i = arg maxj∈N wj(tj)}.
11: for all i ∈ N do
12: if i /∈M(t) then
13: ψi ← 0
14: bi ← −cp
15: else if i ∈M(t), |M(t)| ≥ 2 then
16: ∆i ← 1|M(t)|
17: ψi ← ∆i
18: bi ← q0∆iti − cp
19: else if i ∈M(t), |M(t)| = 1 then
20: ψi ← 1.
21: Find t∗ such that w(t∗) is the second largest
in the vector w(t).
22: if t∗ ≥ ai then
23: bi ← q0t∗ − cp.
24: else
25: bi ← q0ai − cp.
26: end if
27: end if
28: end for
29: end if
30: return (ψ, b)
31: end procedure
Fig. 3: Pseudo-code for the proposed algorithm to find the
optimal spectrum allocation at the moderator
to have the spectrum for itself. In other words, from Equation
(23), we need T ≥ 0. Therefore, if
wmax =
wi(ti); if i = arg maxj∈N wj(tj)0; otherwise,
then it is expected that
U0 = T
= q0
[
E[wmax]− q1q0 ccoll
]
−Ncp ≥ 0.
(30)
Or, equivalently,
E[wmax] ≥ 1
q0
Ncp +
q1
q0
ccoll. (31)
In other words, the proposed auction is feasible only when
the expected value of the maximum valuation among all the
CRs is greater than
1
q0
Ncp +
q1
q0
ccoll. Note that the instan-
taneous value of wmax need not necessarily be greater than
1
q0
Ncp +
q1
q0
ccoll. Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The auction proposed in Theorem 1 is feasible
only if
E[wmax] ≥ 1
q0
Ncp +
q1
q0
ccoll.
Note that, if the ith CR does not get any spectrum, then the
optimal choice of the payment is bi = −cp which is negative.
This simply means that the FC pays an amount cp back to the
ith CR node, as a compensation for sensing. Consequently, the
ith CR participates in the spectrum sensing task with no loss
or gain locally. But, it improves the sensing performance at the
FC and reduces the probability of collision of the moderator
with the PU. This allows the moderator to accumulate a non-
negative utility, on an average.
B. Need for Spectrum Sensing
Our proposed auction mechanism, OAUSA, is designed un-
der the assumption that the moderator does not have complete
knowledge about the availability of PU spectrum. Therefore,
collaborative spectrum sensing is incorporated into the design
of spectrum auctions, which introduced several new costs into
our model. In this subsection, we investigate the merit of
cooperative spectrum sensing by comparing our proposed auc-
tion mechanism, OAUSA, with traditional auction mechanisms
which are not designed for scenarios where the spectrum is
available with uncertainty. In traditional spectrum auctions,
the moderator believes that the spectrum is always available
for auctioning even though it does not have knowledge about
uncertain spectrum availability1. Since the CRs do not pursue
the task of spectrum sensing, cp = 0, thereby resulting in a
collision with the PUs with probability pi1, since the moderator
always allocates the spectrum to the CRs irrespective of
whether PU is using the spectrum or not. Let Uˆ0 and Uˆi denote
the moderator’s and the ith CR’s utilities in the case of a
traditional auction mechanism respectively. Then,
Uˆ0(ψ,b) = Et
[
N∑
i=1
bi − pi1ccoll
N∑
i=1
ψi
]
,
Uˆi(ψ,b, ti) = Et−i [ψiti − bi] .
(32)
Having defined the utility of a traditional auction in the
presence of uncertainly available spectrum, we investigate
the conditions under which collaborative spectrum sensing
provides a greater utility in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Collaborative spectrum sensing in OAUSA is
profitable only when
q1 ≤ pi1 −N cp
ccoll
(33)
Proof: Let us first express the utility of the traditional
auction mechanism, as given in Equation (34), in terms of the
corresponding utilities in the proposed OAUSA framework, as
follows.
Uˆ0(ψ,b) = U0(ψ,b)− (pi1 − q1)ccoll +Ncp,
Uˆi(ψ,b, ti) = Ui(ψ,b, ti) + (1− q0)tiEt−i [ψi] .
(34)
1This consideration follows from the fact that traditional auction mecha-
nisms assume that spectrum is always available for auctioning.
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Therefore, the designer has an incentive to adopt OAUSA
if U0 ≥ Uˆ0. In other words, OAUSA is favored only when
(pi1 − q1)ccoll −Ncp ≥ 0.
Consequently, OAUSA gives a greater utility at the mod-
erator than any traditional auction in scenarios where the
cost of collision at the moderator is significantly larger than
the cost of participation at the CRs
(
ccoll ≥ Npi1−q1 cp
)
. This
is true in most practical scenarios since the penalties for
colliding with the PU are typically modelled to be very severe,
when compared to the instantaneous benefits at the CRs from
acquiring a spectrum. On the other hand, the ith CR’s utility
in the case of traditional auctions is always greater than
the proposed OAUSA auction. This deviation is bounded by
(1− q0)ti, since Et−i [ψi] ≤ 1.
C. Throughput Analysis
In this subsection, we investigate the performance of our
proposed auction mechanism, OAUSA, from a throughput
perspective. We assume that the CRs’ valuations are modeled
in terms of their respective throughput, as defined in Equation
(1) when the moderator allocates the spectrum. We denote the
throughput at the ith CR as xi = log(1 + SNRi). Therefore,
Equation (1) can be rewritten as ti = cixi. Furthermore, we
assume that ci = c with c > 0, for all i = 1, · · · , N .
Without any loss of generality, let j , arg max{wi}
denote the index of the CR that is selected for spectrum
allocation by our proposed OAUSA algorithm. Similarly, let
k , arg max{xi} denote the index of the CR that gives
maximum throughput to the network, when selected. Since
ci = c for all i = 1, · · · , N , we also have k = arg max{ti =
cxi}, and therefore, VCG auction provides maximum network
throughput. Furthermore, we denote the network throughput
due to OAUSA and VCG algorithms as xOAUSA = xj
and xV CG = xk respectively. In the following lemma, we
state that OAUSA achieves the same network throughput as
VCG, when the CR valuations are statistically independent and
identically distributed. Consequently, OAUSA also achieves
the maximum network throughput.
Lemma 5. If all the CRs have independent and identically
distributed valuations, then xOAUSA = xV CG , max x if the
regularity and the feasibility conditions, stated in Theorems 1
and 2 respectively, hold true.
Proof: Consider two valuations t1 = cx1 and t2 = cx2
sampled independently from the same distribution. Let t1 ≤
t2. Since the regularity function holds, let w(·) be the virtual
valuation function. We denote the two virtual valuations as
w1 = w(t1) and w2 = w(t2). Since w(t) is a non-decreasing
function of t, w1 ≤ w2. As a result, given a set of valuations
t and their corresponding virtual valuations w, arg max w =
arg max t = arg max x.
In the case where the CR valuations are not identically
distributed, we compare the average throughput attained by
OAUSA to that of VCG auction in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let j , arg max{wi} and k , arg max{ti =
cxi} denote the indices of CRs selected for allocation in
OAUSA and VCG auction mechanisms respectively. Then, if
the regularity and the feasibility conditions, stated in Theorems
1 and 2 respectively, hold true, we have
xk − 1
c
[
1− F (xk)
p(xk)
]
≤ xj ≤ xk. (35)
whenever ci = c for all i = 1, · · · , N .
Proof: Given that j , arg max{wi} and k ,
arg max{ti = cxi}, we have
wk ≤ wj and xj ≤ xk (36)
But, we have
xi ≥ xi − 1
c
[
1− Fi(xi)
pi(xi)
]
=
1
c
wi (37)
Combining Equations (36) and (37), we have
xk− 1
c
[
1− Fk(xk)
pk(xk)
]
=
1
c
wk ≤ 1
c
wj ≤ xj ≤ xk. (38)
In summary, the proposed auction mechanism, OAUSA,
guarantees an network throughput within
1− F (xk)
c · p(xk) units
from the maximum throughput offered by its counterpart,
namely VCG auction.
V. TRUTHFUL REVELATION OF SENSING DECISIONS
Given that the CRs are selfish and rational, there is a
motivation for the CRs to deviate from truthful revelation
of sensing decisions if they obtain a greater utility. In this
subsection, we investigate the conditions under which CRs
falsify their sensing-decisions, and propose a novel fusion rule
at the moderator that enforces truthful revelation of sensing
decisions.
In order to illustrate this rational behavior at the CRs, we
consider an example network where the CRs have the same
false-alarm and detection probabilities, denoted as Pf and Pd
respectively, and the moderator employs a k-out-of-N fusion
rule. In the following lemma, we show the conditions under
which a CR would unilaterally deviate from truthful revelation
of its sensing decision for this example.
Lemma 6. Let all the CRs operate with identical false-alarm
probabilities, denoted as Pf . Then, if the moderator employs
a k-out-of-N fusion rule, the ith CR unilaterally maximizes
its utility when it always reveals a ’0’ to the moderator.
Proof: Assuming that the ith CR deviates unilaterally in
revealing the sensing decisions to the moderator, we denote
the sensing decision revealed by the ith CR as u˜i. We assume
that u˜i is constructed from ui via a stochastic flipping model,
where α1 = Pr(u˜i = 1|ui = 0) and α2 = Pr(u˜i = 0|ui =
1). Therefore, the global false alarm probability Q˜F due to
unilateral deviation of the ith CR is given as follows:
Q˜F = P˜f
N−1∑
j=k−1
(
N − 1
j
)
P jf (1− Pf )N−1−j
+(1− P˜f )
N−1∑
j=k
(
N − 1
j
)
P jf (1− Pf )N−1−j ,
(39)
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where P˜f = α1+(1−α1−α2)PF is the conditional probability
of u˜i = 1 under H0.
On simplification, we get
Q˜F = P˜f
(
N − 1
k − 1
)
P k−1f (1− Pf )N−k
+
N−1∑
j=k
(
N − 1
j
)
P jf (1− Pf )N−1−j .
(40)
Note that, when α1 = 1 and α2 = 0, we have P˜f = 1, which
results in an upper bound on Q˜F . On the other hand, when
α1 = 0 and α2 = 1, we have P˜f = 0. This results in a lower
bound on Q˜F .
In our proposed auction, the ith CR’s utility increases if Q˜f
decreases, as shown in the following equation.
U˜i(ti) = Et−i [q˜0ψiti − bi − cp]
= q˜0Et−i
[∫ tj
aj
ψj(sj , t−j)dsj
]
= pi0(1− Q˜f )Et−i
[∫ tj
aj
ψj(sj , t−j)dsj
] (41)
Therefore, the ith CR always transmits a ’0’ by choosing
α1 = 0 and α2 = 1 in order to attain the minimum value of
Q˜f and maximize its own utility.
Since the ith CR’s utility can always be improved by uni-
laterally transmitting a ’0’ instead of its true sensing decision,
we focus our attention on the design of a strategy-proof fusion
rule that discourages the CRs from this unilateral deviation.
Theorem 4. A fusion rule is strategy-proof (truthful) if the
moderator disregards sensing decisions from all the CRs with
w∗ = max w in the fusion process.
Proof: Let the ith CR have the maximum virtual val-
uation, i.e., wi = max w. We assume that the moderator
ignores the ith CR’s sensing decision in its fusion rule. Then,
for any CR-index j(6= i), we have wj < wi. Consequently,
the moderator does not allocate the spectrum to the jth
CR. Therefore, since ψj(sj , t−j) = 0 for all sj ∈ [aj , tj ]
irrespective of whether the jth CR tries to increase q0, the
utility of the jth CR is given by
U˜
(m)
j (tj) = Et−j [q0ψjtj − bj − cp]
= q0Et−j
[∫ tj
aj
ψj(sj , t−j)dsj
]
= 0.
(42)
Now, consider the case where j = i. Then, since the ith
CR’s sensing decision is not considered by the moderator in
its fusion rule, it cannot influence q0. Therefore, no CR in the
network can increase its utility by employing a miss strategy.
Furthermore, consider the event where there are multiple
winners in our proposed auction mechanism. If such an event
takes place, based on the above mentioned arguments, it can
be shown in a straightforward manner that a fusion rule is
truthful if the moderator disregards all the winning CRs’
sensing decisions.
Given that the sensing performance changes with the re-
moval of CR decisions from the fusion rule, we present
some analysis on the change in the moderator’s utility in the
following lemma.
Theorem 5. Let U˜0 denote the moderator’s utility when the
sensing decisions from the CR with w∗ = max w are removed
from the k-out-of-N fusion rule. If U0 is the moderator’s utility
when all the CRs’ sensing decisions are accounted for, we have
|U0 − U˜0| ≤
∣∣∣pi0E(wmax)PNf − pi1ccollPNd ∣∣∣
+
N−1∑
j=k
[
pi1ccoll
(
N − 1
j
)
P jd (1− Pd)N−1−j
+pi0E(wmax)
(
N − 1
j − 1
)
P jf (1− Pf )N−1−j
]
.
(43)
Furthermore, as N →∞, we have
lim
N→∞
(U0 − U˜0) = 0. (44)
Proof: Let QF and QD denote the global probabilities of
false-alarm and detection at the moderator, when all the CRs’
sensing decisions are considered in the k-out-of-N fusion rule.
We assume that the ith CR2 has w∗ = max w. In other
words, the proposed strategy-proof fusion rule, as proposed in
Theorem 4, necessitates the removal of the ith CR’s sensing
decision. In such a case, we assume that the moderator’s utility
is U˜0. Both U0 and U˜0 can be found from Equation (30) as
follows:
U0 = q0E(wmax)− q1ccoll −Ncp
U˜0 = q˜0E(wmax)− q˜1ccoll −Ncp
(45)
Therefore, the absolute change in the moderator’s utility due
to the removal of the ith CR’s sensing decision is given by
U0 − U˜0 = (q0 − q˜0)E(wmax)− (q1 − q˜1)ccoll, (46)
where q0− q˜0 = pi0(QF − Q˜F ) and q1− q˜1 = pi1(QD− Q˜D).
From Equation (40), we have
QF − Q˜F =
N∑
j=k
(
N
j
)
P jf (1− Pf )N−j
−
N−1∑
j=k
(
N − 1
j
)
P jf (1− Pf )N−1−j
≤ PNf +
N−1∑
j=k
(
N − 1
j − 1
)
P jf (1− Pf )N−1−j .
(47)
since
(
N
j
)
−
(
N − 1
j
)
=
(
N − 1
j − 1
)
and (1− Pf ) ≤ 1.
Using a similar approach, we can calculate a lower bound
2This assumption that there is only one CR with w∗ = maxw holds true
whenever valuations are sampled from an uncountable set of real numbers
since Pr(wi = wj) = 0, for any i 6= j
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on QD − Q˜D as follows:
QD − Q˜D =
N∑
j=k
(
N
j
)
P jd (1− Pd)N−j
−
N−1∑
j=k
(
N − 1
j
)
P jd (1− Pd)N−1−j .
(48)
Replacing the term
(
N
j
)
with a smaller term
(
N − 1
j
)
,
we have
QD − Q˜D ≥ PNd −
N−1∑
j=k
(
N − 1
j
)
P jd (1− Pd)N−1−j .
(49)
Substituting Equations (47) and (49) in Equation (46), we
have
U0 − U˜0 ≤
(
pi0E(wmax)PNf − pi1ccollPNd
)
+
N−1∑
j=k
[
pi1ccoll
(
N − 1
j
)
P jd (1− Pd)N−1−j
+pi0E(wmax)
(
N − 1
j − 1
)
P jf (1− Pf )N−1−j
]
(50)
Since |a± b| ≤ |a|+ |b| for any real values of a and b, we
get Equation (43) from Equation (50).
Next, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of U0− U˜0 as
N tends to infinity. It is well-known [20] that, for any positive
integral values of n and k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we have
lim
N→∞
QF = 0 lim
N→∞
Q˜F = 0
lim
N→∞
QD = 1 lim
N→∞
Q˜D = 1
(51)
Since lim
N→∞
(QF − Q˜F ) = 0 and lim
N→∞
(QD− Q˜D) = 0, we
have lim
N→∞
(U0 − U˜0) = 0.
Note that, since the valuations are independent of sensing
decisions, the choice of the fusion rule has no impact on the
truthfulness of the auction mechanism in terms of revelation
of CR valuations. Therefore, our proposed auction is strategy-
proof in multiple dimensions, namely truthful revelation of
sensing decisions and valuations.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In our simulation results, we consider a CR network with
10 identical nodes, where we assume the prior distribution of
the PU spectrum usage as pi0 = 0.8 (or equivalently, pi1 = 0.2)
[21]. Also, let the probabilities of false-alarm and detection be
denoted as Pfi = Pf and Pdi = Pd. We also assume that the
moderator employs a k-out-of-N fusion rule in order to make
a global inference about PU’s spectrum availability, where k
is chosen to be optimal in the Bayesian sense [22], as follows.
kopt =

log
(
pi1
pi0
)
+N log
(
1− Pf
1− Pd
)
log
(
Pd(1− Pf )
Pf (1− Pd)
)
 . (52)
Note that kopt is chosen to minimize the error probability
at the moderator. It depends on the number of CRs and
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Fig. 4: Utility of the moderator vs. local false alarm probabil-
ity, for a fixed Pd.
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Fig. 5: Utility of the moderator vs. local probability of
detection, for a fixed Pf .
their probabilities of false alarm and detection, along with
the prior probabilities of the hypotheses. Therefore, if any of
these parameters change, kopt changes in steps due to the ceil
function (d·e).
Then, the global probabilities of false alarm and detection,
denoted Qf and Qd respectively, can be found as follows.
Qf =
N∑
i=kopt
(
N
i
)
P if (1− Pf )N−i , (53a)
Qd =
N∑
i=kopt
(
N
i
)
P id (1− Pd)N−i . (53b)
We also assume that the valuation ti of ith CR is uniformly
distributed over [0,1], i.e. U [0, 1], ∀i = 1, · · · , N . Also, since
both the optimal allocation and CRs’ payments depend on t,
we obtain the results for the proposed auction based on 10000
Monte-Carlo runs.
First, we investigate the behavior of the proposed auction in
terms of the false-alarm and detection probabilities, Pf and Pd
at the spectrum sensors embedded within the CRs. In order to
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Fig. 6: Utility of the moderator vs. participation cost at the
CRs
illustrate this behavior, we assume cp = 0.02 and ccoll = 5 in
our simulation results. In Figure 4, we plot the expected utility
of the moderator in terms of Pf , when the CRs’ detection
probability is fixed at Pd = 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. As per our intuition,
the moderator’s expected utility decreases with increasing Pf ,
since the moderator misses to detect available opportunities
even though the PU channel is idle. Note that the staircase
pattern is due to the change in the optimal value of k, which
is given in Equation (52). Similarly, in Figure 5, we plot the
variation of the moderator’s expected utility with respect to the
CRs’ detection probability Pd, for different values of Pf . Note
that the plot resembles an improving sawtooth curve, where
the sudden drop in moderator’s utility occurs whenever the
value of the optimal k decreases with increasing Pd. In other
words, if k decreases by one unit, a new term appears in Qd, as
given in Equation (53). Since q0 is a decreasing function of Qd,
the expected utility of the moderator abruptly drops and then
improves with increasing Pd as long as the value of k remains
fixed. Also, note that the moderator’s utility becomes negative
whenever the CRs have very low sensing performance (low
Pd, and high Pf ) in both Figures 4 and 5. This behavior can
be explained by the feasibility condition presented in Theorem
2.
In our next set of simulations, we fix the probabilities
of false alarm and detection at the CRs as Pf = 0.1 and
Pd = 0.9. In Figure 6, we present the variation of the
moderator’s utility U0, with respect to the sensing cost cp.
In our simulation, we fix the cost of collision to ccoll =
100, 500, 1000, and vary the cost of sensing cp over a range of
(0, 0.1). Similarly, in Figure 7, we present simulation results of
the moderator’s utility for the proposed auction in terms of the
cost of collision ccoll. In our results, we fix the participation
costs to cp = 0.01, 0.02, 0.05. As expected, we observe that
the moderator’s utility decreases linearly with increase in
ccoll. Similar to our simulation results in Figures 4 and 5,
as shown in Theorem 2, we observe that the proposed auction
becomes infeasible for high cp and ccoll. Also, the optimal
auction always provides a higher utility at the moderator, when
compared to the modified VCG auction as shown in Figures
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Fig. 7: Utility of the moderator vs. collision penalty
6 and 7.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In summary, we have designed the optimal auction for CR
networks in the presence of uncertainty in the availability of
PU spectrum at the moderator. We have considered cooperative
spectrum sensing in our system model to mitigate the effects
of uncertainty at the moderator and improve efficiency in
spectrum utilization. Due to the presence of participation
and collision costs, in addition to the spectrum uncertainty
at the moderator, we have investigated necessary conditions
under which our proposed auction is feasible. Furthermore,
we have addressed the issue to truthful revelation of sensing
decisions, making our auction mechanism strategy-proof in
multiple dimensions. We have compared the performance of
our proposed auction with traditional auctions such as VCG
auction in terms of expected utility at the moderator and
network throughput. Numerical results were also provided
to illustrate the performance of the proposed auction under
different scenarios. In our future work, we will investigate
the problem of spectrum markets under uncertain spectrum
availability where multiple PUs are present in the network.
In addition, we will also investigate the case where a given
spectrum can be spatially reallocated to different CRs in an
interference aware manner.
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